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INTRODUCTION
The dominant form of legal discourse in contemporary America is
1
welfarist. Though there are important alternatives, welfarism also
†

Deputy Dean and Sidley Austin Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The author
thanks Ronen Avraham, Shyam Balganesh, Avi Bell, Jens Dammann, Lee Anne Fennell,
Nicole Garnett, Larissa Katz, Richard McAdams, Gideon Parchomovsky, Stewart Sterk,
Stephanie Stern, and Chris Yoo for comments on an earlier draft, Giuseppe DariMattiacci, Ariel Porat, Mike Schill, and participants at the Symposium on New Dimensions in Property Theory, jointly sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and the University of Texas Law & Economics Workshop for helpful conversations about this topic, Casey McGushin for research assistance, and the Morton C. Seeley Fund and Bernard G. Sang Faculty Fund
for generous research support.
1
See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 54-78 (1996) (personhood); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 762-65 (2009) (human flourishing); Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use
Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 886-92 (natural
rights); Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 10891106 (1998) (Rawlsian justice).
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largely prevails in property theory: most property scholars presume
that maximizing social welfare is the primary goal of a property system
and then analyze particular legal rules or institutions based on how
well they achieve that objective.2
Given that so many property theorists consider ourselves to be
welfarists, it is perhaps surprising that property scholars have largely
ignored developments in behavioral economics suggesting that people
3
derive utility in divergent ways. I am not referring to the fact that
peoples’ preferences differ with respect to, say, the best flavor of ice
cream. A growing experimental literature suggests that, among the
population of those who prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla ice
cream, there are two distinct camps: absolutists and relativists. Those
in the first camp will prefer four scoops of chocolate to three, three to
4
two, two to one, and one to none. This set of preferences is easy for
classically trained economists to understand. Those in the second
camp are more puzzling because they prefer a situation in which they
receive one scoop of ice cream, but those around them receive none,
to a situation in which they receive two scoops of ice cream, but those
5
around them receive three.
In the pages that follow, I will try to show how this finding—that
some people tend to care more about absolute wealth, while others
tend to care more about relative wealth—might help us better understand several mysterious developments in property doctrine and may
explain why certain seemingly low-stakes property disputes prove stubbornly unamenable to informal dispute resolution. Along the way, I
will suggest that because of this heterogeneity, difficult questions lurk
just under the surface in aspects of property doctrine that have long
been thought uncontroversial, at least among welfarists.
Part I of this Article reviews the experimental evidence from behavioral economics, marketing, and law, and explores more fully the
pluralistic nature of welfarist frameworks. Part II examines a series of
inheritance cases involving “double shares” of testamentary estates,
where absolute preferences and relative preferences can help explain
starkly divergent outcomes that result in inconsistent case law and occasionally temperamental judicial rhetoric. Some of this rhetoric
2

See Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1017
(2011).
3
Nestor M. Davidson has discussed the issue at length. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2009).
4
See infra Part I for a detailed discussion of absolute preferences.
5
See infra Part I for a detailed discussion of relative preferences.
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makes dire predictions about how testamentary beneficiaries will respond to particular distributions. Yet unstated and contestable assumptions about relative and absolute preferences are driving those judges’
prognostications. Part III shows how the existence of both absolute
and relative preferences illuminates a potential source of future conflict in takings doctrine and might help explain prominent moves toward “difference splitting” in the modern law of easements and waste.
I. HETEROGENEOUS ABSOLUTE PREFERENCES
AND RELATIVE PREFERENCES
There are two basic stories we can tell about what makes people
feel rich. One story says that people feel rich based on the absolute
resources available to them. A second story says that people are responsive not to absolute wealth but to relative wealth. Economists
have devised simple ways to test how well each of these stories resonates with survey respondents.
For instance, Sara Solnick and David Hemenway’s survey gave respondents two choices: choice A, in which your current yearly income
is $50,000 while others typically earn $25,000, or choice B, in which
your current yearly income is $100,000 while others typically earn
6
$200,000. The survey’s prompt also informed the respondent that
prices of goods and services were the same in both scenarios (i.e., the
7
purchasing power of money remained the same). What state of the
world will people prefer: A or B? The answer is that roughly half the
8
survey population will prefer either choice. That is, survey populations
seem quite heterogeneous, with half the population most concerned
with their absolute income and the other half concerned mostly about
their income relative to others’.
Changing the nature or value of the good being consumed affects
the ratio of respondents preferring more relative resources to more
9
absolute resources. Still, some people appear to be stubbornly oriented
6

Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Is More Always Better?: A Survey on Positional
Concerns, 37 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 377 (1998).
7
Id. It is of course possible that some respondents fought this part of the hypothetical and that answers were skewed accordingly. A better worded question might
have mentioned that “your neighbors and coworkers earn x.” Such phrasing would
have emphasized that scarce commodities like oceanfront land are no harder to get in
a world where immediate peers are earning $200,000 than in a world where they are
earning $25,000.
8
Id. at 378.
9
See Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Are Positional Concerns Stronger in Some
Domains than in Others?, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 147, 149 (2005).
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toward either absolute resources or relative resources even when such
a focus may be disadvantageous. For example, given the competitive
nature of the job application process, one would presume that a job
interview candidate would prefer a better outfit relative to others interviewing for the same position. Nonetheless, one-third of the survey
10
respondents preferred a nice outfit in absolute terms. Similarly, given that any increase in the length of one’s commute leaves drivers with
11
less time to use in more rewarding ways, one would expect survey respondents always to choose a shorter absolute commute. However,
eighteen percent of the survey respondents cared more about the
12
length of their commute relative to that of others.
These sorts of results have also shown up in responses to real-world
stimuli. For example, when San Diego, California opened its fastmoving carpool lanes to drivers willing to pay a toll, the carpoolers
who suddenly had to share “their” lanes with noncarpoolers articulated
13
divergent sentiments. Some objectors grounded their displeasure in
absolute preference terms: more cars in the carpool lanes would
14
lengthen carpoolers’ commute times due to increased congestion.
But other advocates enthusiastically welcomed the change. These carpoolers felt richer precisely because the noncarpoolers using the lane
had to pay a sum of money to enjoy the benefits that the carpoolers
15
were already “freely” enjoying. Robert Frank’s magisterial study of
relative preferences found that similar considerations of relative status
powerfully explained economic arrangements such as the commission
16
17
structures for car salesmen, the salaries of tenured professors, and
18
the proliferation of vice presidents at banks.

10

Id. at 148 tbl.1.
“Commuting ranks dead last” among all major life activities in terms of the happiness it engenders. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1730 (2006) (citing Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey
Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE
1776, 1777 tbl.1 (2004)).
12
Solnick & Hemenway, supra note 9, at 148 tbl.1.
13
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1253 (2000).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1254, 1262-63.
16
See ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
QUEST FOR STATUS 68-75 (1985) (concluding that some automobile salesmen are more
motivated to maximize their commissions whereas others are willing to trade lower
absolute commissions in order to be the biggest fish in a small pond).
11
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On the basis of this and similar evidence, it seems likely that heterogeneity exists in most populations with respect to whether absolute
preferences or relative preferences primarily motivate economic behavior. Frank and others have argued that the desire for status has led
to the competitive consumption of particular goods, thus reflecting a
19
focus on relative as opposed to absolute utility. They have also noted
a possible neurological connection to humans’ propensity to care
20
about relative status. Yet Frank and other social scientists have not
emphasized the pluralistic nature of absolute and relative preferences.
Indeed, a very recent study using functional magnetic resonance imaging technologies to study subjects’ reactions to absolute and relative
gains found that across a large, pooled population, both absolute and
relative gains tended to spark significant activity in reward-related areas
of the brain, but noted that the “variance between subjects is quite
21
large.” The paper found no evidence that men or women were systematically oriented toward relative or absolute gains, but it did not
elaborate on the extent to which there were distinct camps of neuro22
logically absolute—and relative—gain-focused individuals.
Fascinatingly, a small body of literature in the field of marketing
and consumer behavior—largely ignored by economists—strongly
suggests that individuals differ in their levels of status consciousness,
that people are consistently status conscious (or not), and that individuals’ responses to a test measuring status consciousness correlate

17

See id. at 79-82 (finding that top grant-getters are substantially underpaid relative
to the amount of grants they solicit and questioning whether these top earners derive
enough benefit from occupying a high status position to offset their salaries).
18
See id. at 99-102 (suggesting that employees will trade salary for a high-status title,
thus enabling the firm to prevent talented employees from leaving for higher-paying
firms with fewer titled positions available).
19
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 70-72 (1992)
(tying the overconsumption of status goods to the desire for relative status); Robert H.
Frank, How Not to Buy Happiness, DAEDALUS, Spring 2004, at 69, 77-79 (arguing that
people increasingly trade better quality of life for status-enhancing consumption because the latter can be more readily compared to others).
20
See Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 137, 138-39 (2005) (noting that “local rank appears to affect, and be
affected by, concentrations of the neurotransmitter serotonin, which regulates moods
and behavior,” and stating that there is evidence to support a relationship between the
hormone testosterone and local rank).
21
Thomas Dohmen et al., Relative Versus Absolute Income, Joy of Winning, and Gender:
Brain Imaging Evidence, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 279, 283 (2011).
22
Id. at 282.
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23

with their revealed preferences. Survey respondents who scored high
on the personality tests measuring status consciousness were also more
likely to purchase designer sneakers, high-end beers, and luxury cars,
24
and more likely to join fraternities or sororities in college. Levels of
status consciousness were statistically indistinguishable among popula25
tions of students in the United States, Mexico, and China. It is therefore plausible that there are two basic types of status-conscious
26
individuals: “absolute welfarists” and “relative welfarists.”
I will therefore make two defensible assumptions in this Article:
(1) individuals differ in their orientations toward absolute and relative
preferences, and (2) people who are primarily concerned with relative
welfare in one setting are more likely to be oriented toward relative
welfare in other contexts. My working hypothesis is that judges will
display the same heterogeneity in responses when confronted with a
clash between absolute preferences and relative preferences. To test
that hypothesis, Part II will analyze a series of inheritance controversies
in which judges have had opportunities to confront the issue squarely.
Before turning to the inheritance cases, it is worth examining the
absolute-versus-relative-preferences question from a normative perspective. Regardless of the preferences of survey respondents, is there
a “right” way to think about utility—one that the law should privilege?
Are relative preferences counterproductive, such that we might disre23

See, e.g., Jacqueline K. Eastman et al., Status Consumption in Consumer Behavior:
Scale Development and Validation, J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC., Summer 1999, at 41,
44-48 (reporting studies that confirm the validity of a “self-report scale that can be used
in a variety of studies to measure differences in status consumption”).
24
Id. at 45-46. The fraternity finding reinforces my longstanding interest in the
relationship between the collegiate Greek system and property theory. See LIOR JACOB
STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 1-3 (2011) (using a study of the fraternity
and sorority rush process to introduce a book on exclusivity and exclusion).
25
See Jacqueline K. Eastman et al., The Relationship Between Status Consumption and
Materialism: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Chinese, Mexican, and American Students, J.
MARKETING THEORY & PRAC., Winter 1997, at 52, 61, 63 (noting the equivalency, despite statistically significant differences, in materialism preferences).
26
The relationship between status and relative preferences may be highly complex.
Although no one in either literature has made the link, it is tempting to conclude that
status consciousness and relative welfarism are either identical or substantially overlapping. My main hesitation in equating status consciousness and relative welfarism is
based on the correlation Eastman found between status-consciousness and materialism.
See Eastman et al., supra note 23, at 46. In theory, an absolute welfarist could also be
materialistic. Indeed, it is possible that, particularly in the United States, money is the
primary basis for differentiation among elites, so the most status conscious people focus
on amassing as much wealth as possible. Or someone may try to maximize her present
wealth so as to purchase future status, say by “buying an ambassadorship” or retiring to
a life of philanthropy.
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gard them in the same way that some welfarists famously disregard any
27
utility that a Nazi derives from beating a Jew? Two important and
recent articles have suggested that property rights should disfavor relative preferences. In the first article, Nestor Davidson argued that various aspects of property law—such as covenants facilitating the creation
of common interest communities, public use tests enabling the state to
relocate residents, and exclusionary zoning—promote positional com28
petition. He then suggested that such competition for status may be
socially undesirable, so property law ought to curtail it, though he
acknowledged the pathologies that may prevent the state from doing
29
so effectively. Similarly, Barton Beebe has suggested that the “arms
race” for branded, positional goods among those oriented toward rela30
tive preferences is undesirable. He argued that intellectual property
law, especially trademark law, could be weakened to restrain “zero31
sum” competition for status.
32
Relative preferences seem to be hard wired in many people, and
the distinct possibility that biology will thwart governmental efforts to
manipulate individuals’ preferences should not be discounted. But
even assuming that the law could abate or redirect individuals’ relativistic preferences, I am not as convinced that eliminating relative preferences will enhance social welfare, even in a society with high gross
domestic product and human capabilities. As Richard McAdams has
argued, competition for positional goods may not be zero-sum if people care most about their relative status in the fields that matter most
to them, and if people’s heterogeneous endowments allow them to

27

For a law-oriented introduction to the debate within utilitarianism, see James S.
Fishkin, Justice Versus Utility, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 265-68 (1984) (reviewing UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982)).
28
Davidson, supra note 3, at 805-10, 812.
29
See id. at 812-16 (discussing three approaches—taxation, information, and property law—that the government could adopt to combat status competition).
30
Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV.
809, 819 (2010).
31
Context matters in evaluating Beebe’s normative argument. It is instructive that he
writes about competition for scarce, branded luxury goods in a modern, industrialized
society. Were we to contemplate, for example, competition for shelter in modern
Haiti, we might prefer that the relative welfarists outnumber the absolute welfarists in
the population. Given the widespread poverty in Haiti and the low quality of its housing stock, a population comprised solely of absolute welfarists would contain a far
greater number of unhappy people than a population comprised entirely of relative
welfarists. In the latter society, at least a segment of the population would feel happy
with their houses.
32
See Dohmen et al., supra note 21, at 282-83.
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33

excel in divergent fields.
Even if we limit ourselves to discussing
those relative preferences that are zero-sum, arguments for trying to
fight those preferences should be cabined. In the short run, the zerosum nature of some relative preferences implies that Jill, a relative wel34
farist, will feel worse off if Jack is made better off. But the long-run
effect of Jill’s unhappiness is indeterminate. Perhaps her unhappiness
will motivate Jill to work harder or innovate more, thereby increasing
35
the odds that she will compose a song or cure a disease. (She might
even discover a foolproof way to convert relative welfarists into absolute welfarists!) Widespread complacency in a rich society filled with
absolute-preference oriented individuals could, similarly, impoverish
future generations. Moreover, McAdams has argued persuasively that
competition for positions of high status largely explains the creation
36
and enforcement of social norms. It is hard to tell a story about how
competition for absolute resources could have similar effects. In
short, although arms races for positional goods may be wasteful in a
static environment, this potential waste does not demonstrate that the
law should seek to channel consumption away from positional goods.
Before concluding that the state should try to socially engineer
relative preferences out of existence, we should better understand the
distribution of talents in a society; the tendency of particular economic
systems to reward those talents differentially; the dynamic effects of
redistributive taxation on wealth creation; and the extent to which the
relative preferences of consumers in one country are influenced by the
purchasing patterns of consumers in another country. It is little wonder, then, that a review of twentieth-century policy interventions designed to curtail competition for positional goods concluded that the
37
policies had failed. To summarize my disagreement with Davidson
33

McAdams, supra note 19, at 49-51.
Where the law is confronted with pure distributional problems, such as how a
windfall inheritance ought to be divided among multiple heirs, there is no reason to
prefer known relative or absolute preferences in divvying up the bounty. Of course,
shying away from one type of preference or the other may be justified if discerning
some parties’ true absolute or relative preferences proves to be more difficult.
35
Cf. McAdams, supra note 19, at 59-62 (suggesting that relative preferences can
correct market failures, though recognizing that the greater effort produced by relative
preferences is not always beneficial).
36
See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 357-86 (1997) (discussing how the esteem theory—which includes
esteem “in comparison to others”—influences societal norms).
37
See Roger Mason, Conspicuous Consumption and the Positional Economy: Policy and
Prescription Since 1970, 21 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 123, 128-31 (2000); see also
McAdams, supra note 19, at 72-79, 83 -103 (discussing the successes and failures of legal
34
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and especially with Beebe, I believe we need to be skeptical about both
the law’s ability to restrain relative preferences effectively and the
ultimate desirability of that enterprise.
Having voiced that concern, I will now pursue a path quite different
from that taken by Davidson and Beebe. Whereas they asked what
should be done about preferences in various domains, I will emphasize
the non-universality of relative welfarist preferences and examine how
the cohabitation in our society of relative welfarists, absolute welfarists,
and people who feel the tug of both frameworks affects property doc38
trine and judicial rhetoric. I begin with inheritance battles.
II. APPELLATE CASE LAW CONSIDERING DUAL INHERITANCE FROM
ADOPTION WITHIN THE BLOODSTREAM
Sibling resentment is an ancient topic. Themes of familial jealousy
provide much of the Bible’s most compelling drama. Cain’s resentment of Abel began when God accepted Abel’s burnt offering of a
39
sheep willingly, while rejecting Cain’s offering of vegetables. This
40
prompted a “very wroth” Cain to slay his brother in a field. Esau had a
more compelling grievance against his younger brother Jacob: Jacob
convinced a starving Esau to exchange his birthright for a bowl of lentil
41
stew. Not long after, Jacob conned their father Isaac into bestowing
42
upon Jacob a blessing that had been intended for Esau. Robbed of
his blessing and cheated of his birthright, Esau vowed to kill Jacob as
43
soon as Isaac died. Yet Jacob eventually avoided Abel’s fate by placat44
ing Esau with a gift, a great deal of livestock. Jacob’s own children
would hardly be immune to brotherly treachery. Joseph was Jacob’s
45
favorite son. Joseph’s brothers resented his special relationship with

efforts, including taxation and antidiscrimination laws, to curtail competition for positional goods).
38
Frank’s book is sensitive to this cohabitation, though it is not a primary theme in
his book. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 16, at 75 (noting that those oriented toward absolute or relative gains may sort themselves into different firms within the labor market).
39
Genesis 4:4–5(King James).
40
Id. 4:5–8.
41
Id. 25:29–34.
42
Id. 27:1–30.
43
Id. 27:41.
44
Id. 32:14–15 (“Two hundred she goats, and twenty he goats, two hundred ewes,
and twenty rams, thirty milch camels with their colts, forty kine, and ten bulls, twenty
she asses, and ten foals.”).
45
Id. 37:3.
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their father and coveted the coat that Jacob gave Joseph. They therefore faked Joseph’s death and sold him into slavery for twenty pieces of
47
silver. After Joseph became rich and powerful in Egypt, he eventually
forgave his brothers and treated them well, though he conspicuously
gave more food, clothing, and silver to his little brother Benjamin,
48
49
who was uninvolved in his abduction. And so on and so forth.
While those interested in sibling resentments, parental favoritism,
and unintended inheritances can start their reading with the Book of
Genesis, they need not stop there. This Part will show that nineteenthand twentieth-century law provides these same sorts of tales in abundance—particularly the law of inheritance, which causes jurists to
struggle fiercely with their brethren.
Cases involving unforeseen adoptions, especially adoptions within
the bloodstream, force courts to confront the question of whether a
particular Benjamin is entitled to more benjamins than his kin. Jurists
often bring to bear absolute and relative welfarist considerations as
they struggle with these cases.
At the outset, it is worth contrasting two exemplary cases. One reflects an absolute preferences orientation, while the other reflects a
50
relative welfare orientation. In re Benner’s Estate showcases the former
view. Martha Ann Benner had one daughter, who had three children
51
of her own. After Martha’s daughter died, Martha adopted one of
52
53
her grandchildren, Henry Benner. Martha then died intestate. A
legal question immediately arose as to how Henry should be treated
under the intestacy statute. Should he be treated just as a son? Just as
a grandson? As both a son and a grandson? As a son, he would take
46

Id. 37:4.
Id. 37:20–33.
48
Id. 43–45.
49
Jens Dammann alerted me to the fact that relative preference sentiments are
articulated in the New Testament as well. For example, in Matthew 20:1–16, a householder hires laborers to work in his vineyard for a penny a day. At dusk, when the laborers who have been working since the morning realize that those who worked in the
vineyards for only an hour are also receiving a penny, they complain. The householder
responds that he is paying the workers exactly what he promised to pay, and his generosity towards those who started working late in the day is a good deed towards the latearriving workers, not a slight against the early-arriving workers. The early-arriving
workers exhibited relative preferences but the householder insisted that absolute preferences were the relevant ones.
50
166 P.2d 257 (Utah 1946).
51
Id. at 257.
52
Id.
53
Id.
47
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half of Martha’s estate, with his birth sisters splitting the other half.
55
As a grandson, he would take one-third of Martha’s estate. Finally, as
both a son and a grandson, he would take two-thirds of Martha’s estate
56
(one-half as a son plus one-sixth as one of three grandchildren).
Henry argued that he should be treated as both a son and a grandson, but the lower court decided that he should be treated only as a
57
son and thus receive half the estate. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that Henry should be treated as both a son and a
58
grandson. To reach this result, the court first found the inheritance
statute unclear as to how adoptions of grandchildren should be treat59
60
ed. The court then noted that several earlier cases had prohibited
61
dual capacity inheritances, but the court rejected such cases on several
grounds, the most interesting of which is the following: “Had a person
not a relative been adopted by decedent, the other heirs would not
have had one person less in their own family entitled to take by representation and they would therefore have gotten no more than they will
62
now.” With this sentence, the court turned a dispute in which both
absolute and relative preference considerations might explain the
probate challenge’s motivation into one where the decisive analytical
issue concerns relative preferences alone. By altering the pertinent
baseline, the court weakened the moral authority of the beneficiary
who argued that he was cheated out of a fair share of the inheritance.
To fully understand this clever argument in Benner’s Estate, we
should follow it to its natural conclusion. Under the court’s ruling
that Henry was entitled to inherit as a son and a grandson, each of
Henry’s birth sisters received one-sixth of Martha’s estate. Suppose
instead that Martha had adopted a young Richard Posner instead of
Henry. Under those circumstances, Henry and his birth sisters would
have each wound up with one-sixth of the estate, and Posner would
have inherited half of Martha’s estate. Therefore, the court’s ruling
essentially told the birth sisters, “It’s none of your business whether

54

Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.
56
Id. at 259 (Turner, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 257 (majority opinion).
58
Id. at 259.
59
Id. at 258-59.
60
See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing some of the reasons why
courts have prohibited dual inheritances).
61
In re Benner’s Estate, 166 P.2d at 259.
62
Id.
55

Strahilevitz Original Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

2168

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

5/16/2012 2:35 PM

[Vol. 160: 2157

Henry gets one-sixth or two-thirds. You should care only about what
you receive, not about what you receive in relation to others.” Translation: the sisters contesting the will should focus only on absolute preferences, not relative preferences. And under the absolute preferences
framework they lose.
To call this argument clever is not to suggest that the court’s reasoning is airtight. Martha manifested no obvious intention to adopt
Richard Posner or anyone else outside the bloodstream. Had she
known that her adoption of Henry would have no legal effect on his
future inheritance, it is unlikely that she would have adopted a
63
stranger instead. Indeed, the difference between treating Henry as
both a son and a grandson, rather than only as a son, was meaningful
for the sisters in absolute welfare terms. If Henry had inherited only as
a son, he would have taken half of Martha’s estate, leaving each of his
birth sisters with one-fourth of the inheritance rather than the onesixth they received under the court’s decision. Although the court did
not directly confront this argument, it did state that “when a person
64
adopts a child an act of favoritism is shown thereby.” But it is unclear
whether Martha’s actions were motivated by love for Henry, some animosity toward his siblings, or another factor. Perhaps Henry was the
youngest and least independent of the grandchildren.
Writing as the sole dissenter in Benner’s Estate, Justice Turner objected with six-shooters blazing. To Justice Turner, a dual inheritance
“will tend to destroy the proper relationship which should exist be65
tween one adopted and children of the parent’s blood.” That was
not, however, the entire problem for Justice Turner, whose impassioned plea on relative utility’s behalf I now quote at length.
After the relationship of parent of adoption and child is created, can
there be anything of greater moment for a child’s happiness and general
welfare than the love and respect of brothers and sisters of adoption and
the love and respect of the boys and girls born of his own natural parents? If we are concerned primarily with the welfare of the child we must
be concerned with the preservation of these relationships. They cannot
exist when the adopted child gives evidence of such a covetous nature
that he would take a dual inheritance at the expense of these.

63

If the assumption about adopting a stranger strikes the reader as wildly implausible, then the court’s explicit invocation of the absolute preferences argument becomes
particularly telling with respect to the judges’ states of mind.
64
In re Benner’s Estate, 166 P.2d at 259.
65
Id. at 260 (Turner, J., dissenting).
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. . . We can rejoice that cases identical with this are rare, not because
grandchildren are seldom adopted by the grandparent, but that the child
of adoption seldom seeks a greater inheritance than that of natural children.
The desire for more is evidence of greed. Greed is a vicious disease.
At first it develops slowly and is often unobserved. When in its obvious
stage it becomes as malignant as internal cancer. Its germs may spread
like a plague. Blight of the malady is all about us. Surely greed deserves
66
no sustenance from a court of justice.

Cancer. Plague. Greed. Malignancy. There is a lot of emotion evident in Justice Turner’s choice of metaphors, based largely on his
prediction that kin will think about inheritances in relative preference
terms and that jealousy will result from double shares. Query whether
Justice Turner generates as much light as heat. The trial court’s decision, which Justice Turner would have liked to affirm, would have left
Henry with twice the share of Martha’s estate that each of his sisters
67
received. Might such an arrangement not produce the same familial
jealousy and discord that so troubles Turner? Alternatively, if Henry
were represented by an executor because he is a minor, his siblings
could direct their anger at the executor. Even if Henry were acting on
his own behalf, he might have decided that the benefits were worth the
costs associated with provoking his siblings’ jealousies. Finally, it is possible that Justice Turner had causation backwards: maybe requests for a
dual inheritance are not a cause of familial discord, but rather a consequence of it. For example, Henry’s older siblings might have abandoned him upon their mother’s death, thus prompting both Martha’s
decision to adopt him and his desire for retribution.
Having presented an example of absolute preference-oriented rea68
soning in Benner’s Estate, I now turn to Unsel v. Meier, which typifies
the relative welfare approach. Unsel amplifies Justice Turner’s arguments by stripping them of some of their emotional content while
simultaneously elevating them to the level of public policy concerns.
Unsel also involved an adoption within the bloodstream. Instead of an
intestacy case, however, Unsel involved a probated will that tried to create a fee tail.
69
One of John Hart’s six children, Harry, predeceased him. Under
the terms of his will, John wanted each of his five surviving children
66
67
68
69

Id. at 260.
Id. at 257 (majority opinion).
972 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 469.
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and his three grandchildren via Harry to take a share of his extensive
70
71
real estate holdings in fee tail. John died in 1966. By 1992, the prospects for his eighty-year-old daughter, Vivian, to produce biological
72
offspring looked dim. So Vivian adopted her adult niece, Judith,
73
Judith was Lena’s only
whose mother was Vivian’s sister, Lena.
74
daughter, but Lena also had a surviving son, James Hampton. After
Vivian died in 1996, Judith was her only issue, and the question arose
as to whether Judith was entitled to both a fee simple interest in the
real estate held by Vivian and an expectation interest in half of Lena’s
75
property interest.
Perhaps seeking to avoid the sort of moral indignation expressed
by Justice Turner’s dissent, Judith foreswore any intention to take via
76
her biological mother, Lena. All she sought was Vivian’s interest in
the real property. Judith’s relatives, acting as appellants, argued that,
to the contrary, Missouri law would not strip Judith of the ability to
take via Lena, permitting Judith a “double share” of John’s real es77
tate. The Unsel court concluded that the adoption would not extin78
guish Judith’s right to take property via Lena. It therefore had to
confront the double share issue. Citing language from an earlier case,
the court stated,
It is no part of the public policy of the state that adoption should operate
as an instrumentality for dual inheritance, with resulting animosity and
litigation among those whom a testator provided in his will would share
with equality and per stirpes. And the denial of dual inheritance under

70

Id.
Id. at 468.
72
But cf. Genesis 17:17–19 (noting that Sara was ninety years old at the time of
Isaac’s conception).
73
Unsel, 972 S.W.2d at 469.
74
Id.
75
Missouri law converts fee tails into
71

“an estate for life in the first taker, with the remainder in fee to the person to
whom the estate tail would, on the death of the first taker, pass according to
the course of the common law.” Consequently, by these wills and this statute,
Lena held a life estate interest in the various tracts and the heirs of her body
took the contingent remainder interests in fee.
Id. at 470 (citations omitted) (quoting Davidson v. Davidson, 167 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Mo.
1943)).
76
See id. (stating that respondents on behalf of Judith asserted that under the law,
the adoption severed her relationship with Lena and her interest in Lena’s property).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 471.
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these circumstances is not opposed to the public policy of promoting the
79
welfare of adopted children.

As the Unsel court saw it, then, “To recognize Judith’s adoption in relation to the entailed interest would enable her to receive a double
80
share and would violate the expressed public policy of this state.”
Perhaps to help insulate its opinion from appellate review, the Unsel
court then reached an independent basis for the decision apart from
public policy, by finding that permitting Judith to take Vivian’s share
would contravene John’s intent that his children and grandchildren
81
be treated equally.
Under Unsel v. Meier, the prediction that relative preferences will
shape kins’ assessments of their own inheritances is enshrined as a
tenet of Missouri public policy. While it is true that some of John’s
offspring would have gotten less of his land had the decision come out
the other way, at least two ( J udith and James) each saw their respective interests in the real estate shrink from one-sixth to a little over
one-twelfth. It is by no means clear that John’s intent would have favored one outcome over the other. Moreover, it is worth running the
Benner’s Estate thought experiment on the facts of Unsel. What would
have happened if Vivian had adopted a stranger, rather than her
niece? That stranger would have wound up with a one-sixth interest in
John’s real estate. Given a choice between two of his natural grandchildren each receiving a one-sixth interest in his real estate and an
adopted adult outside his bloodstream receiving that one-sixth interest,
can it be supposed with confidence that John would have preferred the
82
latter situation over the former? The reverse seems more plausible.
The only way it makes sense to say that an adoption within the
bloodstream violates public policy more than an adoption outside the
bloodstream is if one accepts a strong version of the relative preferences

79

Id. at 471-72 (quoting Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. Palms, 229 S.W.2d 675, 681 (Mo.
1950)); see also Palms, 229 S.W.2d at 681 (“We find nothing in this will to indicate any
intention that one grandchild, or that the children of any one of testator’s children,
should have more than one share of the Dickson trust estate. Any intention so capricious and inequitable cannot be read into the will.”).
80
Unsel, 972 S.W.2d at 472.
81
Id.
82
The law ought to do its best to respect the preferences that the testator would
have articulated in the absence of transaction costs so as to reduce estate planning expenditures during life. Indeed, if the law perfectly respected the preferences that testators would have articulated were they still alive, such a result would maximize the
incentives for testators to accumulate and preserve wealth while minimizing the incentives to bother with writing a will. Both results would represent Pareto improvements.
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story. But grafting such a view onto John’s intentions goes beyond the
evidence available. While Judith’s kin no doubt resented the possibility of a double recovery, they might have expressed even more hostility
to an interloper adopted by an eighty-year-old woman, largely for the
purposes of depriving Vivian’s nieces and nephews of real property to
which they would otherwise have been entitled. Yet the effect of Unsel
is to encourage precisely these sorts of adoptions of adults outside the
bloodstream.
A survey of similar cases reveals a similar fragmentation of judicial
opinion. As previously indicated, no court has followed Benner’s Estate
down the path of comparing an adoption in the bloodstream to a hypothetical adoption outside the bloodstream. Like their Show-Me
State brethren, the justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court
viewed a dual inheritance as an “extreme . . . situation” raising “unnat83
ural and abnormal possibilities.” The court therefore embraced a
clear statement rule: dual inheritances would only be recognized by
the court where the will spelled out the testator’s preference for such a
84
This canon of construction presuming no double
double share.
85
shares mirrors the public policy interest invoked in Unsel. Similarly,
in Morgan v. Reel, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that adoptions
were intended to “put the adopted child on the same footing as actual
children . . . but not on any more favorable footing. This would be the
86
natural and presumed intent.” It therefore held that a granddaughter
who became the testator’s daughter by adoption would inherit only as a
87
Judith in Unsel
daughter, not as a daughter and granddaughter.
88
sought the same outcome, of course, but the court there thwarted her.
Delano v. Bruerton, a Massachusetts case, embraced the same sort of
reasoning. The court held that an adoption could make the adoptee
89
equally well off as his new siblings, but no better off. It therefore
rejected the demand of the testator’s grandson by birth, who was also a

83

Young v. Bridges, 165 A. 272, 277 (N.H. 1933).
Id. at 276.
85
Unsel, 972 S.W.2d at 471-72.
86
62 A. 253, 256 (Pa. 1905).
87
Id. at 257.
88
See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Indiana
embraced reasoning similar to its Pennsylvania counterpart. See Billings v. Head, 111
N.E. 177, 177-78 (Ind. 1916) (“[I]t was not the legislative purpose that an adopted
grandchild should ever inherit more . . . than would one of his natural children . . . .”
(citing Delano v. Bruerton, 20 N.E. 308 (Mass. 1889), and Morgan, 62 A. 253)).
89
20 N.E. at 309.
84
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son by adoption, for a double share of the testator’s estate. To the
court, “the adopted child would almost invariably take more as an
adopted son than he could by right of representation or inheritance
91
through his parents.” Happily, the court did not stop there. Instead,
it paused to consider a hypothetical put forth by counsel, one that
would make any law professor proud:
We think the only exception is the one supposed by the counsel for the
guardian, which is that a man who has had four children adopts his greatgrandson, who by the intermarriage of cousins is the only issue of two of
the children of the adopting parent. In that case he would take more as a
great-grandson by right of representation of his parents than he would as
92
an adopted child of the intestate.

Alas, the court’s response was unsatisfying. It deemed the hypothetical
“so extremely unlikely to occur that it cannot have much weight in the
93
interpretation of the statute.” A pity. Jan Ellen Rein once argued
that such cases reach the correct result because most testators would
not have contemplated the possibility of “manipulative adoptions” at
94
the time they executed their wills. But none of these jurisdictions
place extra legal obstacles in front of the testator who wishes to adopt
someone outside the bloodstream.
Contrary authorities are as numerous. The Kansas Supreme
Court, while recognizing the controversy associated with adoptees receiving double shares, insisted that such “inequality . . . is created by
95
statute.” After quoting at length from the Indiana, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts opinions discussed above, the Kansas court simply char96
acterized these court’s reasoning as “not convincing.” By contrast, an
Illinois court did a better job of explaining its rejection of the antidouble share rule in In re Estate of Cregar—it asked, in essence, What is
the problem with testamentary inequality, particularly where different
97
generations are concerned? After all, said the court:

90

Id.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 808-09 (1984).
95
In re Bartram’s Estate, 198 P. 192, 194 (Kan. 1921).
96
Id.
97
333 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
91
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Our present Probate Act which provides for distribution to descendants of
collateral kindred per stirpes has a certain element of inequality built into
it. If one sister or brother of the intestate has one child whereas another
sister or brother has two children, then a descendant of the latter sister or
brother would receive only one-half as much as the descendant of the first
sister or brother. Therefore, there seems to be no clear-cut legislative
policy in Illinois which opposes unequal shares among nieces or nephews
98
of an intestate.

The Cregar court may have pulled its punches. While equal distribution among children is common in the United States, it is hardly universal. According to one 1996 study, 21.4% of all testators with
99
multiple children provide for unequal shares among their children.
And the United States is far more tolerant of unequal shares than
some other democracies. For example, Norway requires that twothirds of a decedent’s estate be shared equally among siblings where
100
The remaining
the decedent is survived only by multiple children.
third can be divided as the testator sees fit.
101
In short, a review of the authorities reveals divergent approaches.
Some courts think that, holding a plaintiff’s share constant, it should
make no difference to the plaintiff whether a particular relative gets a
larger share of a familial inheritance. Other courts view double shares
as a result so certain to poison familial relationships that state public
policy ought to prohibit such arrangements in the absence of a clear
statement by the testator that such a distribution was intended. The
uneven reaction among judges mimics the lack of consensus among
102
respondents to social science surveys. If this admittedly small sample
of cases is indicative, then judges (like people in general) seem to be
evenly divided, with approximately half accepting legal arguments that
98

Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Iowa took a different tack toward
justifying double shares by noting that the natural parents of adopted children sometimes do not consent to the severance of the parent-child relationship, which makes it
strange to suppose that an adoption terminated the adoptee’s right to inherit from his
biological parents. Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532, 534 (1879). The court thus reframed the issue as a question of biological parents’ rights. Absent any indication of an
intent to disinherit adopted children, the court refused to read one into the statute. Id.
99
B. Douglas Bernheim & Sergei Severinov, Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for
the Equal Division Puzzle, 111 J. POL. ECON. 733, 734 n.1 (2003). Additional studies place
the figure as high as 37.5% or as low as 15.7%. Id.
100
Elin Halvorsen & Thor O. Thoreson, Parents’ Desire to Make Equal Inter Vivos
Transfers, 57 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 121, 123 (2011).
101
See Lisa A. Fuller, Note, Intestate Succession Rights of Adopted Children: Should the
Stepparent Exception Be Extended?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1188, 1217-18 (1992) (discussing
different ways in which states react to “‘double share’ dual inheritance”).
102
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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seem to assume an absolute preference orientation among heirs, and
the other half opting for outcomes that implicitly assume relative preference orientations. To be sure, hints of absolute and relative preferences are prominent in some cases, yet absent in others. Some judges
envision themselves as engaging in a purely formalist exercise, but
both the formalist opinions and those invoking policy interests also
seem to split roughly down the middle.
In light of this heterogeneity, it is perhaps surprising that many
judges use emotionally charged rhetoric when anticipating how beneficiaries will respond to particular distributions. Though the survey
data does not tell us this, it is possible that many individuals who think
primarily in terms of absolute preferences have some difficulty projecting relative preferences onto beneficiaries, and vice versa. To speculate further, it is possible that the sort of disconnect that shows up in
both the survey responses and the case law is a “cultural cognition”
effect, similar to those identified by Dan Kahan, Donald Braman, and
103
their coauthors. Their work identifies a number of commonly recurring cultural orientations, each of which perceives risks or ideological
issues in ways common to those who share the same orientation, but
fundamentally different from those who share alternative orienta104
Although a focus on absolute preferences versus relative weltions.
fare and status consciousness are not part of the cultural orientations
they develop in their work, it is conceivable that one’s welfare preference correlates with other aspects of particular cultural orientations.
III. EXTENSIONS TO OTHER ASPECTS OF PROPERTY LAW
The underlying issue of relative and absolute preferences is by no
means limited in application to inheritance. Let us begin with the law
of takings. A key difference between the inheritance cases and the
takings cases is that the former primarily concern gains for the heirs,
whereas the latter involve losses imposed on landowners. Experi-

103

See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); Dan M. Kahan &
Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1308 (2003) (concluding that individual’s positions on gun
control are largely founded upon the cultural views they have formed).
104
See Kahan et. al, supra note 103, at 849-51 (discussing how four Americans from
varied cross-sections of life would interpret the facts in Scott v. Harris differently because
of their backgrounds); Kahan & Braman, supra note 103, at 1299-302 (hypothesizing
that demographics and cultural indicators are actually the strongest predictors for attitude on gun control).
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mental evidence has indicated that relative preferences are more pro105
We therefore might exnounced in the realm of gains than losses.
pect to find the law of takings more receptive to an absolute-losses
orientation than the law of inheritance. Yet, as we shall see, it is not
clear that the case law reflects that contextual distinction.
Under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, private property may
106
not be taken for public use without just compensation. The primary
test for determining whether a government regulation has gone so far
as to amount to an unconstitutional taking of private property is the
107
The first prong of the Penn Central test directs
Penn Central test.
judges to focus on the “economic impact of the regulation on the
108
claimant.” The greater the loss to the claimant, the more likely it is
that the regulation amounts to a taking. The test is oriented toward
absolute losses, though those losses are expressed as a fraction of the
109
claimant’s ownership interest. Hence, an owner who has suffered a
ninety percent diminution in value is quite likely to prevail under the
Penn Central test, even if the dollar amount lost is relatively small, say a
few thousand dollars. By contrast, an owner who loses tens of thousands of dollars in value from a multi-million dollar property is almost
sure to lose under Penn Central.
As Penn Central jurisprudence has evolved, however, the doctrine
has shifted away from focusing largely on considerations of absolute
preferences to invoking notions of relative preferences. Penn Central
itself hinted that these considerations would be relevant. The Court
noted that Grand Central Station, whose owners claimed that the
application of the city’s historic preservation law amounted to a taking,
was situated on one of more than 400 parcels in New York City whose
110
Some subsequent
development potential was similarly restricted.
Supreme Court cases and influential academic commentary have come
to understand the Penn Central test as a proxy for whether “the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that
111
We might understand
should be borne by the public as a whole.”

105

Solnick & Hemenway, supra note 9, at 149-50.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
108
Id. at 124.
109
Id. at 131.
110
Id. at 132.
111
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 123-25); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (identifying “being singled out to bear the burden” as a hallmark of a takings violation); Saul
106
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this shift toward thinking about the state’s imposition upon the claimant in relative terms as evincing renewed interest in relative preferences. To be sure, there are other reasons to care about singling
out—for example, people might be risk averse, or singling out might
indicate a breakdown in normal local politics that imposes harms that
112
But the shift may also be motisound in “equal protection” terms.
vated by knee-jerk relative preference instincts.
Other branches of takings law similarly implicate both absolute
and relative preferences. Justice Scalia’s famous majority opinion in
113
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council nods in both directions simultaneously. The Lucas test provides a bright-line rule and an exception.
A per se taking occurs where the state deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial use” of land (the rule), unless the deprivation
inheres “in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership” (the
114
The bright-line rule part of the Lucas test is oriented
exception).
toward absolute preferences—a 100% loss in the value of land is a taking. But the exception is heavily relativistic. In determining whether
the state’s justification for a wipeout regulation obviates the need to
compensate, the courts are instructed to examine not only the contents of state law as it existed at various points in time, but also whether
the Smiths are being treated worse than the Joneses. In the Court’s
words, “The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law
prohibition . . . . So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly
115
situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant.”
There are several possible explanations for the “background principles” exception. One is that the Court seeks to make it more painful
for the state to regulate aggressively without paying compensation, by
essentially preventing the state from treating grandfathered users
more favorably than newcomers. But a conceivable alternative explanation for—and an indubitable effect of—the Court’s language is to
make the payment of compensation inevitable where the state’s regula-

Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344-48 (1991) (discussing the nuances of “singling out” in takings law).
112
See Levmore, supra note 111, at 1344-46 (identifying an “equal protection element in takings law” stemming from the notion that the government may not single
out a party that is politically unprotected).
113
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
114
Id. at 1027-29.
115
Id. at 1031.
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tion demoralizes both absolute welfarist and relative welfarist owners.
Perhaps Lucas’s previously unrecognized genius is that the rule only
116
applies in the “relatively rare situation[]” in which landowners of any
stripe would be fighting mad.
Some pockets of state constitutional takings law more closely resemble inheritance law, where absolute and relative preferences do not
coexist peacefully, but rather undergird dueling majority and dissenting opinions. A fine example of the absolute versus relative preferences split in takings law is San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San
117
Francisco.
In that case, the California Supreme Court considered a
San Francisco ordinance that required the owners of about fivehundred residential hotels in the city either to maintain or replace
existing units that housed low-income occupants or pay a fee to the
118
The owners of
city’s Residential Hotel Preservation Fund Account.
the San Remo Hotel wanted to convert the building from one that
housed some long-term residents into one that catered exclusively to
119
The city required them to obtain a conditional
short-term tourists.
use permit before allowing the conversion, and green-lighted the conversion only after the owners paid $567,000 into the preservation ac120
The owner paid this fee under protest and then sued,
count.
alleging that the city had taken its property in violation of the California
121
Constitution’s Takings Clause.
122
Dissenting, then-Justice Brown viewed the city’s extraction of
123
$567,000 as a taking. As she saw the case, it was unconscionable for
the city as a whole to place the burden of addressing the community’s
low-income housing needs on five-hundred residential hotel owners
124
who “certainly did not cause poverty in San Francisco.” What is most
striking about Brown’s eloquent opinion is its unrelenting focus on
the “singling out” inquiry. In her view,
[n]o matter the analysis, the facts of this case come down to one thing—
the City and County of San Francisco has expropriated the property and
resources of a few hundred hotel owners in order to ameliorate—off

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 1018.
41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002).
Id. at 92, 109.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 122 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Brown moved from the California Supreme Court to the D.C. Circuit in 2005.
Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 120.
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budget and out of sight of the taxpayer—its housing shortage. In short,
this ordinance is not a matter of efficiently organizing the uses of private
property for the common advantage; instead, it is expressly designed to
shift wealth from one group to another by the raw exercise of political
125
power, and as such, it is a per se taking requiring compensation.

Notice what Justice Brown leaves out. Because her emphasis is on how
the hotel owners fare relative to the taxpayers and other landowners of
San Francisco, Justice Brown barely mentions the $567,000 payment.
We do not know whether the payment represents a large or a small
portion of the value of the San Remo Hotel’s property. We do not
know whether such a payment made a small dent in the owner’s cash
126
Because Jusflow or rendered the conversion project unprofitable.
tice Brown would like to replace the balancing inquiries from Supreme Court cases like Penn Central, Nollan v. California Coastal
127
128
Commission, and Dolan v. City of Tigard with a new, per se test, inquiries such as the extent of diminution in the property’s value drop
out of the equation. So too does any consideration of whether the city
requires the owners to maintain an existing use or engage in a new
use—for Justice Brown such Penn Central considerations were irrele129
Because “the City has essentially said to 500 unlucky hotel
vant.
owners: We lack the public funds to fill the need for affordable housing in San Francisco, so you should solve the problem for us by using
your hotels to house poor people,” the city ordinance, according to
130
Justice Brown, was unconstitutional on its face.
The majority opinion in San Remo focused much less on the relative preferences of the hotel owners, as compared with those of other
San Francisco voters and property owners. Rather, its focus was on the
absolute burdens placed on the plaintiffs, the extent to which the

125

Id. at 125-26.
One might infer that San Remo’s payment of the $567,000 fee to the city, followed by the commencement of the suit, suggested that the project would still be profitable after the fee was paid. But one cannot be sure, since it is possible that the owner
decided that (1) the prospects of prevailing in litigation were good, and (2) the costs of
delaying the conversion project until after a final resolution of their claims would be
prohibitive.
127
483 U.S. 825 (1987)
128
See 512 U.S. 374, 386-87, 394-95 (1994) (reaffirming the principle in Nollan
when finding no “essential nexus” between the state’s interest for a public greenway
and bicycle pathway, and the permit condition to pave a parking lot).
129
San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 127 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“Nor can the HCO be justified under the theory that the City is merely requiring property owners to continue
the existing use of their property.”).
130
Id. at 127-28.
126
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regulation required a continuation of the owners’ prior uses of the
land, and the practicalities of the situation. Writing for the majority,
Justice Werdegar noted that how much the particular plaintiffs were
losing remained the relevant calculus: “[T]he HCO neither targets an
arbitrary small group of property owners, nor deprives all the burdened properties of so much of their value, without any corresponding
131
The question of how
benefit, as to constitute a taking on its face.”
much money San Remo lost, a fact ignored by Justice Brown, was
132
deemed a central inquiry by Justice Werdegar. Similarly, the majority
emphasized that—as in the Penn Central case itself—the San Remo Hotel
was being asked to continue an existing use that was presumably prof133
To the majority, considerations of relative welfare were unitable.
likely to be decisive. It did not matter that only five-hundred owners
were being singled out for a disparate burden, because the HCO
should not be looked at in isolation. Rather, it should be understood
as part of a much larger system of government burdens and benefits
134
that should hopefully balance out over the long haul.
Clashes between relative and absolute preferences also arise in the
135
law of easements. Take the casebook staple of Brown v. Voss. In that
case, Brown had an express easement to cross Voss’s land (parcel A)
for the purposes of “ingress to and egress from” parcel B.136 Brown
then purchased parcel C, which abutted parcel B, and began using the
easement to construct a home that straddled the property line be137
tween parcels B and C. After bad blood developed between the two
neighbors—Voss constructed a “concrete sump and a chain link fence
within the easement”—Brown “sued [Voss] for removal of the obstruc-

131

Id. at 109.
Id.
133
See id. (“Also like the landmarks law upheld in Penn Central, the HCO allows the
property owner to continue the property’s preordinance use unhindered; like the
landmarks law, therefore, the HCO ‘does not interfere with what must be regarded as
[the property owner’s] primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.’” (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978))).
134
See id. (“Thus, the necessary reciprocity of advantage lies not in a precise balance
of burdens and benefits accruing to property from a single law, or in an exact equality
of burdens among all property owners, but in the interlocking system of benefits, economic and noneconomic, that all the participants in a democratic society may expect to
receive, each also being called upon from time to time to sacrifice some advantage,
economic or noneconomic, for the common good.”).
135
715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). For casebook treatment of Brown, see, for example,
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 820-25 (7th ed. 2010).
136
Brown, 715 P.2d at 515.
137
Id.
132
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tions.”
Voss countersued for easement misuse.
He argued that
while Brown was entitled to use the easement to reach parcel B, any
use of the easement to reach the larger combined parcel exceeded the
140
scope of the easement. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with
141
Voss that Brown’s actions amounted to easement misuse, though it
142
affirmed the lower court’s denial of injunctive relief.
The famous dispute was exacerbated by Brown’s strongly held view
that it was completely unreasonable for Voss to care whether Brown
143
used the easement to reach parcels B and C or just parcel B. Asked
on cross-examination whether he had ever sought Voss’s permission to
use the easement for the benefit of parcel C, Brown answered, “Why
144
Once Brown arrived at parcel B via the easement, what
should I?”
possible basis could Voss have for caring whether Brown continued on
to the adjacent parcel C ? Brown thought in terms of absolute preferences. Voss, by contrast, was offended that Brown never asked him for
permission to expand the scope of the easement and never communicated with Voss about his plans to build a house straddling the bound145
Thus, it is not accurate to suggest that relative
ary of both parcels.
preferences considerations clearly motivated Voss. While he understood the black letter rule deeming Brown’s use of the easement to
reach parcel C a trespass, he seemed more concerned with Brown’s
perceived arrogance than with anything else. Regardless, Voss plainly
did not approach the dispute in the same absolute preference terms as
Brown. It seems plausible that similar absolute-versus-relative preference disconnects that emerge in judicial opinions explain why particular
controversies develop into intractable disputes resulting in litigation.
Whereas the takings cases focus the court’s attention on a litigant
who has lost property, and the inheritance cases focus on litigants who
stand to gain property (some more than others), a case like Brown v.
Voss is manifestly zero-sum. Parties are fighting over a finite resource,
and one party’s losses inevitably entail another party’s gains. At the
138

Id. at 516.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 517.
142
Id. at 518.
143
See Elizabeth Samuels, Stories Out of School: Teaching the Case of Brown v. Voss, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 1445, 1467 (1995) (“In [Brown’s] view, his easement gave him access
to both parcels; once he passed onto one half of his property, parcel B, he then had a
right to continue from there to the other half of his property.”).
144
Id. at 1474.
145
Id. at 1483-84.
139
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same time, whether the parties understand their conflict in absolute or
positional terms may drive their feelings of utility and disutility, which
may in turn explain their propensity to litigate.
The obviously zero-sum nature of the dispute is a possible explanation for why Brown v. Voss ultimately splits the difference between the
relative and absolute preference approaches. On the one hand, the
court held that the use of the easement to benefit the enlarged parcel
146
was an easement misuse (a sort of trespass). On the other hand, the
court—relying on the trial court’s equity balance—held that Voss was
147
not entitled to injunctive relief. In cases involving easement misuse,
courts ordinarily hold that property rights to exclude ought to be pro148
tected with property rules. The law of easement misuse thus exhibits
an orientation toward relative welfare considerations. Yet the Brown
court seemed to feel that no judicial resources should be devoted to
the ongoing enforcement of an injunction in a case where the entirety
of the harm seemed relative, not absolute. At the same time, the court
refused to embrace a bright-line “this is not a trespass” rule, perhaps
because it implicitly understood that the use of an easement to benefit
a larger dominant estate will sometimes impose higher absolute costs
to the owners of the servient tenement. As the size of a dominant parcel grows, the burden on the servient parcel ordinarily increases.
Brown is not the only case in which a strange remedy hints at conflicts among judges or panels that feel the tug of both absolute and
149
relative welfare considerations. Take Woodrick v. Wood, a 1994 Ohio
150
controversy that is a principal case on the law of waste.
Woodrick
concerned an old barn that straddled the boundary between two plots
151
A mother, Catherine Wood, and her son, Sheridan Wood,
of land.
152
owned one plot of land. The other plot of land belonged to Catherine (who held a life estate), with the remainder interest divided between herself (who had a three-quarters share) and Patricia Woodrick,
153
her daughter (who had a one-quarter share). Catherine and her son

146

Brown, 715 P.2d at 517.
Id. at 518.
148
See, e.g., Penn Bowling Recreation Ctr. v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64, 66
(D.C. Cir. 1949); Schadewald v. Brulé, 570 N.W.2d 788, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
149
No. 65207, 1994 WL 236287 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 1994).
150
This case is also excerpted in JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 135, at 218-20.
151
Woodrick, 1994 WL 236287, at *1.
152
Id.
153
Id.
147
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wanted the barn torn down, while Patricia wanted it preserved. The
trial court found that while the barn itself had a value of $3200, the
property as a whole would be worth more if the barn were torn down
155
than if it were maintained.
Although the English common law held that any permanent destruction of a structure constituted waste, even if it improved the value
156
of the parcel as a whole, most American courts have long since reject157
ed this common law rule. Under the modern approach, an act that
158
increases the value of property cannot constitute waste. Because the
American law of waste concerns itself exclusively with absolute preferences, and market valuations provide the least controversial measure
of welfare in land use settings, the court refused to enjoin the destruc159
tion of the barn. The trial court nevertheless ordered Wood to pay
Woodrick $3200 upon tearing down the barn, and the appellate court
160
In the appellate tribunal’s words, “The trial
let this result stand.
court’s decision to award Woodrick the value of the barn was not a
payment to justify waste but was, instead, indicative of the trial court’s
intent to protect the rights of both parties and to reach a fair resolu161
tion of their dispute according to the law.”
The appellate court’s affirmance of the $3200 payment is puzzling.
Without a finding that Wood’s destruction of the barn amounted to
waste, there was no legal basis for the award of damages to Woodrick.
Based on the evidence, the destruction of the barn would make an
ordinary landowner better off, not worse off, and aside from
Woodrick’s participation in the litigation, there was little or no evidence to show how much value Woodrick ascribed to the barn. As a
matter of black-letter law, the trial court simply erred, though Wood’s
failure to cross-appeal on the issue arguably precluded its reversal by

154

Id.
Id. at *2.
156
Id.
157
A leading American case that breaks with the English common law rule is Melms
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738, 740 (Wis. 1899), which stated, “Must the tenant stand
by, and preserve the useless dwelling house, so that he may at some future time turn it
over to the reversioner, equally useless?” For a rich discussion of the American break
with the English rule, and the economic, republican, and developmental reasons behind it, see Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 668-75 (2006).
158
See, e.g., Woodrick, 1994 WL 236287, at *2.
159
Id. at *3.
160
Id.
161
Id.
155
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the appellate court. Yet, the appellate court nevertheless invoked no162
tions of fairness to justify the damages award. As a matter of legal realism, what explains the survival of Woodrick’s remedy without a right?
The most plausible explanation of what the court (and perhaps
Wood) might have been thinking is akin to idiosyncratic valuation.
More precisely, even though the market defined the barn as a negative
value asset, it had sentimental value to Woodrick. The barn had been
163
on the property for more than twenty-five years, and Woodrick was
164
(evidently) sufficiently attached to it to litigate against her mother.
Under these assumptions, the destruction of the barn would not have
equal effects on Wood and Woodrick. For Wood, the destruction
would be all positive—she would enjoy economic gains that eclipsed
any sentimental attachments. But while Woodrick would gain her
share of this economic upside—as the remainder’s market value would
increase after the barn was razed—she would also suffer a loss that the
other remaindermen would not even feel.
Even though the black-letter law of waste was telling the trial court
that it should ignore this positional inequality, the trial court may have
been unable to help itself from considering the problem in relative
preference terms. And from a relative preferences perspective, the
fact that Woodrick alone would suffer a sentimental loss struck the
trial court as an unfair outcome, no matter if the evidence still suggested that Woodrick would benefit economically from the barn’s razing.
So the trial court basically did something lawless. The appellate court
then convinced itself that this importation of relative welfare considerations into an absolute welfare doctrine was proper, as it approved of
the trial court’s “intent to protect the rights of both parties and to
165
reach a fair resolution of their dispute according to the law.”
It is impossible to prove that relative preference considerations
explain the otherwise puzzling result in Wood, and I do not want to be
understood as making that strong claim. As with the inheritance cases
and the easement cases, it is plausible that other aspects of the case
drove the judges’ reasoning. Indeed, without looking too hard, we
could find cases where judges refused to enjoin the destruction of an
162

Id.
Id. at *1.
164
Or, to recap the themes of sibling rivalry discussed earlier, the relationship between mother and daughter might have already been so damaged as to engender the
litigation, perhaps on some pretext like an old barn. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
165
Woodrick, 1994 WL 236287, at *3 (emphasis added).
163
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asset when the razing increased the value of the underlying property,
thereby denying any recovery to a party that objected to the changed
166
use of the land. In short, we should not predict that half of the time,
let alone all of the time, courts confronting factual scenarios like
Wood ’s will try to convert results congenial to absolute preference considerations into those congenial with relative preference considera167
tions, or do the reverse in cases resembling Brown v. Voss. Rather, we
should use the concept of relative and absolute preferences, and the
apparently heterogeneous orientation of the population toward those
frameworks, to supplement our understanding of what might have
motivated the parties and judges in a given case.
We can make this point more broadly. The dispersion of absolute
and relative preference sentiments throughout the populace does not
explain every mystery in property theory. But it might help explain
some of them. Equipping ourselves with tests to identify segments of
the population that are oriented more towards absolute gains and relative gains, respectively, we might understand why two neighbors use a
state supreme court, rather than neighborliness norms, to resolve an
168
And once such a case has
ordinary dispute over an easement.
reached a judicial tribunal, differing conceptions of how individuals
experience gains or losses can point judges toward legal rules that appropriately reflect the pluralism in our society. At present, some judges
simply do not seem to realize that there are multiple ways of thinking
about preferences, and that lacuna evidently prompts them to write
decisions that are unnecessarily dogmatic, emotional, or rigid. Other
judges may feel the tug of both sorts of preferences simultaneously,
and this tension could prompt them to equate tests that are not equivalent or to craft “split-the-difference” remedies that introduce conceptual confusion into property doctrine. For the reasons I suggested in
Part I, the normative case against relative preferences is tentative at
169
As a result, it would be inappropriate for judges to conclude
best.
that state public policy interests favor absolute preferences, such that
ambiguous language should be construed as consistent with absolute
welfarist preferences.

166

For an example of such a case, see Beesley v. Hanish, 521 A.2d 1235, 1241 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
167
See supra notes 135- 142 and accompanying text.
168
The classic work on informal neighborliness norms and their importance in
preventing the litigation of garden-variety disputes among neighbors is ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
169
See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
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Pulling the lens back even further, we might expect to see the same
sorts of dynamics that I have described here arising in other common
law subjects, especially contracts. A contract dispute might escalate
because one party to a transaction brought a set of absolute preferences to a transaction while relative preferences informed the counterparty’s understanding of the terms. If the world is indeed equally
divided between relative and absolute welfarist types, then courts casting about for a default term that will make everyone happy, or best reflect the likely meetings of the minds, are doomed to fail. Perhaps the
best we can hope for is a world in which individuals are consistently
oriented toward either absolute or relative preferences. If we obtain
that empirical result, then courts at least should be able to resolve cases
in which two like-minded parties contract, but one of the parties mis170
represents her prior assumptions for strategic advantage ex post. But
where two people of divergent types have created an ambiguous contract, splitting the difference may be the lesser evil. The realm of testamentary disposition is, by contrast, more satisfying. Because the
thoughts and preferences of only one party (the testator) are at issue,
courts are more likely to be able to utilize the evidence before them to
reach the “right answer” in any given legal dispute.
CONCLUSION
There is no clear normative answer to the question of whether
courts ought to care about absolute preferences or relative preferences. People do not think monolithically. Some seem primarily concerned with absolute welfare. Others seem primarily concerned with
relative welfare. And still others might feel the competing pull of each
way of thinking, focusing alternatively on one or the other, depending
on the context. The mistake courts seem most commonly to make is
to avoid a pluralistic conception of human motivation. Whereas the
double share cases stridently assume away hard questions of human
intent and behavioral psychology, the more appropriate approach is to
gather, in an intellectually honest way, evidence about how a particular
decedent thought about preferences and justice during his own life.
170

Even in those situations of preference convergence, further questions arise. For
example, is the relevant comparison for relative welfarist Raymond to counterparty
Clara in the contract negotiations, or to Raymond’s co-workers, neighbors, and college
roommates? If the former comparison is relevant, then a focus on fair distribution of
any contractual surplus may be appropriate. If the latter comparison is decisive, then a
court might try to maximize the joint value created by the contract so that Raymond
and Clara both see their relative welfare enhanced.
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In so doing, the courts ought to recognize that the relevant legal question is solely one of getting inside a particular person’s head, not making sweeping pronouncements of state public policy interests that
assume that a one-size-fits-all approach can explain actors’ motivations
in property controversies. To the extent that absolute welfarists and
relative welfarists have different conceptions of the good, courts and
legislatures might consider creating two sets of tailored default rules—
one for those who think about resources in absolute terms, and anoth171
er for those who think about them in relative terms.
More broadly, this Article has posited that some clashes between
neighbors or will beneficiaries may themselves be explained by the
disconnect between these two divergent approaches to thinking about
resource distribution. Recall Brown’s inability to understand why it
was any of Voss’s business whether the easement across Voss’s land
172
benefited one parcel or two.
And recall the divergent characterizations of those seeking double shares—described in neutral terms by
the Benner’s Estate majority and in condemnatory terms by the dissent173
As lawyers seek to mediate these cases or settle them
ing judge.
before trial, they need to recognize that the plaintiff and defendant
may be talking in entirely different languages, each of which boasts a
respectable number of native speakers. Those focused on absolute
preferences are not greedy, malignant automatons; nor are those
focused on relative preferences irrational, status fetishists. They are all
ordinary people trying to make sense of the world and the laws that
govern their lives within it.

171

Ariel Porat and I are developing this idea at much greater length in a separate

article.
172
173

See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
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